





















ABSTRACT: This paper deals with Peirce’s understanding of perceptual judgment, relating it 
to the conditions for the use of language defined by Michael Dummett. Namely, drawing on 
Dummett’s requirement for harmony between descriptive and evaluative aspects of our 
linguistic practice, we will try to give an interpretation of Peirce’s view of perception that 
implies rejecting the idea that the formation of a perceptual judgment has an inferential 
structure. On the other hand, since it is, in Peirce’s opinion, the structure of abductive 
inference, this approach should enable us to draw some conclusions related to abduction in 
general. 
KEY WORDS: Perceptual judgment, abduction, deduction, detection, percept, percipuum, 
descriptive and evaluative aspects of the meaning, non-conservative extension of language. 
 
I 
In addition to the existing forms of valid arguments, induction and deduction, the great 
American philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce has introduced another one into philosophy 
that he called abduction, defined it, inter alia, as an "induction respecting qualities" (CP 
2.706.). By his own account, he came to this new form of inference by analysing Aristotle’s 
syllogistic figures.  
Namely, Aristotle made a distinction primarily between perfect and imperfect 
syllogisms. A perfect syllogism is one in which introduction of new premises cannot affect 
the truth of the conclusion. This is true in the case of deduction where, from the premises 
such as Socrates is a man, and All men are mortal we can infer that Socrates is mortal – 
which corresponds to Aristotle’s first figure. However, the second and the third figure 
corresponding respectively to the form of the argument 1) Socrates is a man, Socrates is 
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mortal, therefore, All men are mortal and 2) Socrates is mortal, All men are mortal, therefore, 
Socrates is a man are examples in which introduction of new premises could affect the truth 
of the conclusion, which is why Aristotle considered them imperfect. 
However, although they have some features in common of which the above 
imperfection or non-conclusiveness is certainly the most significant, these two types of 
inference in Peirce’s view should, nevertheless, be distinguished. Namely, unlike the first one 
in which, based on the characteristics of a singular case we reach a conclusion about the 
characteristic of the entire population, the situation is quite opposite in the second one 
because we do not determine what the characteristic of a given population is, but to what 
population a particular case belongs. It follows that of the above, so-called imperfect 
arguments, the first would have the form of induction, while the second one would be an 
example of abduction.1 
In other words, Peirce improved Aristotle’s syllogistic by, inter alia, recognizing that 
each of his figures corresponds to one of the three basic forms of valid argument; deduction, 
induction, and a new type that he called abduction. However, what is significant to us is that 
Peirce also considered the process whereby we reach a perceptual judgment to be an example 
of abductive reasoning. In short, the formation of a perceptual judgment has, according to 
Peirce, the following structure: 
 
                                                             
1 Therefore, while from the premises Socrates is a man and Socrates is mortal the conclusion All men are 
mortal follows by induction, in the case of abduction we would infer, based on certain characteristics of a 
singular case such as Socrates, to what population or class of objects it belongs. Thus, from the premises such as 
Socrates is mortal and All men are mortal, according to the abductive rules of inference, it follows Socrates is a 
man which clarifies the meaning of Peirce’s thesis that abduction is in fact an 'induction respecting qualities'. 
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Object S has properties P1, P2, P3, P4 
Class M has properties P1, P2, P3, P4 
S is M 
If we pause here and compare the above form of the argument with our initial example 
Socrates is mortal, All men are mortal, therefore, Socrates is a man, where S is - Socrates, P - 
mortal and M – a man, it seems that there would be sufficient grounds to conclude that 
perception and abduction are just different names for the same mental activity, i.e. one that 
has classification as its primary goal.2 However, that they are not exactly the same thing even 
in Peirce’s view is evidenced by the fact that, unlike the inference according to abductive 
rules of entailment, the formation of a perceptual judgment he treats as "absolutely forced 
upon our acceptance, and that by a process which we are utterly unable to control" (CP  
5.157). 
Although this thesis sheds light on Peirce’s view as regards the specific difference 
between perception on the one hand and abduction on the other, it makes us recognize a 
certain tension in it that is important to us.  
                                                             
2 We should not be deceived here by extra predicates compared to the example we started with, because in 
addition to the predicate mortal, we could introduce others that would apply to both Socrates and the human 
species (such as wise, rational, etc.) without affecting the structure of the argument itself that remains abductive. 
In other words, since by using a general predicate such as in this case the predicate man 'something is subsumed 
under a class', we notice that the process whereby we reach a perceptual judgment has a specific inferential 
structure and that it is the structure of abduction; moreover, the function of abductive reasoning is in Peirce’s 
view precisely that "to substitute for a great series of predicates forming no unity in themselves a single one 
which involves them all" ( CP 5.276). 
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Namely, if the formation of a perceptual judgment is, as Peirce says 'absolutely forced 
upon our acceptance by a process which we are utterly unable to control', this means that the 
process whereby we reach it is subconscious. However, if this is the case, the question is how 
it also has the inferential structure that Peirce claims it does, i.e. the structure of abductive 
inference? 
In a word, through thesis that the formation of a perceptual judgment is the result of 
using both our conscious and unconscious capacities, we can identify two hardly compatible, 
if not quite conflicting tendencies in Peirce’s reasoning. Assuming that a process can be 
either conscious or unconscious – depending on which of these two levels it is realized – first 
we will try to specify this contradiction, and then to resolve it (to the extent that it is within 
our power) by applying Dummett’s view of harmony between descriptive and evaluative 
aspects of our linguistic practice to Peirce’s interpretation of perception. 
 
II 
In a book dedicated to Frege’s work, Michael Dummett specified various aspects of our 
linguistic practice as well as the requirement that, in order for it to be successful, there has to 
be an agreement or harmony between them. 
Specifically, Dummett distinguishes two aspects of the use of a term or a sentence, the 
first one referring to "conditions under which an utterance of that sentence is appropriate, 
which include, in the case of an assertoric sentence, what counts as an acceptable ground for 
asserting it, and the consequences of an utterance of it, which comprise both what the speaker 
commits himself to by the utterance and the appropriate response on the part of the hearer, 
including, in the case of assertion, what he is entitled to infer from it if he accepts it" 
(Dummett 1973: 396). 
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Both of these aspects represent for Dummett aspects of the meaning of a term or an 
assertion: the former is called descriptive and the latter evaluative aspect. However, what is 
significant and what Dummett particularly insists on is that there must be harmony between 
them; otherwise, it would be a sign that the meaning of an assertoric sentence should be 
questioned.  
While acknowledging that it is not easy to determine a general criterion for what might 
constitute this harmony, Dummett nevertheless gives an example when it would de facto be 
compromised. 
Namely, "a simple case would be that of a pejorative term, e.g. 'Boche'. The condition 
for applying the term to someone is that he is of German nationality; the consequences of its 
application are that he is barbarous and more prone to cruelty than other Europeans" (Ibid., 
454). However, although this will allow the distinction between descriptive and evaluative 
aspects of the meaning that philosophers of ordinary language tend to make, unlike them 
Dummett points out that we would have to assume "connections in both directions as 
sufficiently tight as to be involved in the very meaning of the word: neither could be severed 
without altering its meaning. Someone who rejects the word does so because he does not 
want to permit a transition from grounds for applying the term to the consequences of doing 
so. The addition of the term 'Boche' to a language which did not previously contain it would 
be to produce a non-conservative extension" (Ibid.).  
Therefore, Dummett expresses the requirement for harmony between different aspects 
of the meaning (descriptive and evaluative ones) through one condition which is that 
introduction of a term into a language would be legitimate only in cases when it would 
represent a conservative extension of that language. Conversely, any disharmony between 
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descriptive and evaluative aspects of the meaning such as the one illustrated by Dummett’s 
example would be a symptom of its non-conservative extension.3  
The question is, however, how is this related to Peirce’s interpretation of perception 
because the impression is that, whatever preconceptions we may have about him, the problem 
of perceptual judgment falls outside the domain of the philosophy of (ordinary) language? 
In other words, does it not seem that, if we were to apply Dummett’s method, we would 
have to uncritically identify objects in which the phenomenal aspect is predominant, with 
those that have their meaning in the foreground? Although this is true in a sense, we can state 
in our defence that we will, in what follows, stick to what they have in common which is 
primarily the fact that both linguistic and non-linguistic entities stand as stimuli in relation to 
cognitive subject, that is, they are both objects of our comprehension, and equally so. 
Namely, what, despite all the differences between them linguistic and non-linguistic 
entities undoubtedly have in common is that we become aware of both through perception, as 
evidenced by the discipline whose subject is speech perception. On the other hand, the thesis 
about the linguistic character of entities that are the usual subject of a perceptual judgment is 
supported by the fact that it can easily be interpreted in the form of an assertion; more 
precisely, we can say that a perceptual judgment – at least in its most general form – is 
nothing but an assertion, but an assertion that would, in most cases, refer to something 
obvious which is why we usually do not utter it. 
                                                             
3 It should be said that the introduction of concepts such as conservative and non-conservative language 
extension is Dummett’s generalization of the point made by Belnap, commenting on Prior’s example of 




If we adopt these insights as our starting point, the thesis is that the application of 
abductive inference for the sake of forming a perceptual judgment would be an example of 
non-conservative extension of language, that is, it would always satisfy only evaluative 
conditions which would disrupt harmony that should exist between them and descriptive 
conditions. On the other hand, since our interpretation of what belongs to a language will be 
somewhat broader than the usual, that is, since we will treat perceptual judgment as part of 
our linguistic practice and include in it those entities that are traditionally not considered 
linguistic, it should be expected that our interpretation of which are descriptive and which 
evaluative aspects of the meaning of a term and harmony between them will be different from 
the one offered by Dummett. However, in order to get there, first we need to examine more 
closely the examples of valid arguments questioning Peirce’s thesis that the result of our 
classificatory activity is always non-conclusive, or that this activity necessarily has the 
structure of abduction. 
 
III 
As previously stated, Peirce believes that we form a perceptual judgment by subsuming 
several different predicates we are directly acquainted with under one general concept that is 
in fact, a sign of a class. In this regard, we gave an example of the argument where, from the 
premises Socrates is mortal and All men are mortal we arrived at the conclusion Socrates is a 
man. 
However, from the minor premise that Socrates is mortal, and the major one that all 
people are mortal it does not follow conclusively that Socrates is a man, because mortality is 
not solely a human, but a feature of all living beings. Also, from the premise such as Socrates 
is wise we cannot infer with certainty that Socrates is a man because, even if all people were 
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wise Socrates would not have to be a man because he could be a some kind of deity. In other 
words, the fact that not only people are wise (that is, that wisdom is not a predicate attributed 
only to people), in conjunction with the fact that not only people are mortal serves as a 
confirmation that by simply multiplying premises, or by multiplying properties or predicates 
in the case of abduction we will still not come to a conclusion that would be conclusive, or 
whose truth would not be affected by the introduction of additional premises. 
Although there is nothing here that would make abductive inference an invalid type of 
argument – because one of its characteristics is that it is, just like the inductive one, 
epistemically weaker than deductive inference – we must nevertheless note that all those 
predicates that can be attributed to the concept 'Man', or, as Peirce would say, which we 
replace with a general predicate that is 'Man' in this case do not have the same value in our 
inference. In short, it seems that the two predicates stand out in terms of the strength of the 
inference because not only they apply to the whole species, but they cannot be extended to 
other populations. 
Specifically, what has been adopted to apply to all people and only them is that they are 
two-legged and rational creatures, so if we attribute these characteristics to Socrates, we 
could abductively conclude that Socrates is a man. However, since in this case the concepts 
'Rational' and 'Two-legged' creature would be treated as synonymous with the concept 'Man', 
that is – to use Aristotle’s terminology – since all three as signs would be reliable indicators 
of humanity, it seems that the argument Socrates is two-legged/rational creature, All people 
are two-legged/rational creatures, therefore, Socrates is a man would not in fact be an 
example of abductive argument because from the minor premise Socrates is a man, and the 
major one All people are two-legged/rational creatures in one case we could come to a 
conclusive viz. deductive conclusion that Socrates is a two-legged, and in the other that he is 
a rational creature. For the sake of clarity, we will try to reformulate the problem. 
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Namely, if we assume that these concepts are coextensive as it is usually assumed they 
are (i.e. the concepts 'Man', 'Two-legged creature' and 'Rational creature'), the question is 
which of them, if it appeared in the conclusion would be a sign that the argument used is an 
example of deduction instead of abduction and vice versa? 
It seems that we cannot get a definite answer to this question because if the concept 
'Man' signifies a particular class, we must assume that this also applies to every other that 
would be coextensive with it. It follows that, depending on which of the above concepts 
would be in the premises, abductively we could infer conclusively not only that Socrates is a 
man, but also that he is a two-legged and a rational creature. However, although with each of 
these arguments, as Peirce says, we "subsume something under a class" (CP 8.66) and 
therefore, each would be an example of abductive argument, the problem is that none of them 
would have the property that abductive conclusions are supposed to have, in short, none of 
them would be non-conclusive.4 
In other words, although our intuition tells us that these terms are not entirely same – 
which, expressed in technical terminology would mean that although they have the same 
reference, they still do not have the same sense – it is also clear that we cannot determine this 
by purely logical means, or it would be possible only by introducing a certain convention 
                                                             
4 Therefore, by transposing the premises and conclusions in the above arguments we will not get anything that 
would indicate a specific difference between the concepts contained in them, because as soon as we adopt them 
as reliable indicators, we get a type of deductive argument that is considered a paradigm of logical validity 
because in it, as we have said, when the premises are true, the conclusion is necessarily true too. On the other 
hand, the matter is further complicated by the fact that, since they are coextensive and that all three are a sign of 
a class, in cases where they appear in the premises deduction would be such that we would come to the 
conclusion which 'subsumes something under a class', hence, Socrates under the classes of two-legged and 
rational creatures which in turn also brings into question whether the distinction we make between it and 
abduction is justified. 
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according to which the concepts 'Two-legged' and 'Rational' creature would not be 
coextensive with the concept 'Man'. And so the novelty that Peirce introduces, faced with 
such examples, inter alia, is to abandon a purely formal, anti-psychological approach to 
logic, increasingly acknowledging the role of normativity and context in logical research. In 
the context of current discussion, this would mean that the following question should be 
asked: how do we reach judgments – presumably true – such as: 'This is a man', 'This is a 
two-legged creature' and 'This is a rational creature'? 
 
IV 
Therefore, both in the case of affirmation and in the case of negation of these concepts 
being coextensive, Peirce believes that this is, ultimately, always a certain (linguistic) 
convention. However, by moving from the formal to contextually sensitive logic5 he will 
increasingly point out that judgments such as 'This is a man', 'This is a two-legged creature' 
and 'This is a rational creature' actually impose themselves on us by a process we cannot 
control and which we identify with perception. Although, generally speaking, Peirce will do 
it too, he will nevertheless maintain the idea of continuity between the view in which 
perception is regarded as the result of a process we cannot control, and the one that it has a 
certain inferential structure as evidenced by theses such as that "perceptual judgments are to 
be regarded as an extreme case of abductive inferences", and that "abductive inference shades 
into perceptual judgment without any sharp line of demarcation between them" (CP 5.181) 
etc. 
                                                             
5 For a more detailed, and even a more accurate account of this transition as well as the reasons that led to it see: 
Isaac Levi, "Beware of Syllogism: Statistical Reasoning and Conjecturing According to Peirce", Cambridge 




While there is no doubt that the multitude of Peirce’s comments on this subject include 
those that would support the presumed continuity – such as the idea that perceptual judgment 
is not only an integral part, but "the starting point or first premiss of all critical and controlled 
thinking" (Ibid.) – as we pointed out at the beginning, this seems completely unacceptable. In 
order to show that this view is untenable, we will assume the presence of a hypothetical 
subject or perceiver who has before him an object he is trying to classify. We will assume 
that the result of our perceptual judgment is 'Man', while for the hypothetical perceiver it is a 
concept that he calls 'Quoche'. 
If it is only a matter of the difference in the linguistic convention we use, as a sign of a 
certain class, this concept could in many ways be the same as the notion we have. In other 
words, if we assume that the judgment 'Quoche' is formed by subsuming under it several 
predicates that do not form a unity by themselves, there is no reason to reject in advance the 
possibility that our hypothetical perceiver, in line with his linguistic convention subsumes 
under it the same predicates that we do when we form the judgment 'This is a man' such as a 
two-legged creature, a rational creature, etc. Yet we do not know what the content of the term 
'Quoche' is; moreover, we can with great certainty assume that the result of the perceptual 
judgment in these two cases is, as Peirce calls it, a substantially different percipuum. 
However, we can also notice that it is caused by one and the same stimulus or, as Peirce 
would say, percept; this allows us to, since we are unable to decipher his, our perceiver try to 
teach our concept so that in the future he would interpret the percept that excites it in the way 
we do. In this regard, if we assume for the sake of example that the concept in question has 
the value of a class, it seems that teaching the term 'Man' would imply the reverse application 
of the rule we would follow when deciphering the term 'Quoche', i.e. in both cases we would 
start with the assumption that what constitutes an abstract notion of an object is in fact a set 
of predicates included in it.  
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In other words, in order to get a more or less complete idea of what we mean when we 
form the judgment 'This is a man', Peirce’s approach implies that we would have to teach the 
hypothetical perceiver all the predicates we subsume under it, such as a two-legged creature, 
a rational creature, etc. However, although it would have a certain cognitive value, we believe 
that this strategy would be quite inappropriate for the purpose of perception, because even if 
we were to teach our hypothetical perceiver the concept 'Man' in this way, it seems that in his 
case it would never had the strength to 'impose itself on him by a process he cannot control', 
that is, it would never be the result of perceptual judgment in the way it is supposed to be in 
ours. To verify this, we will use Dummett’s distinction between descriptive and evaluative 
aspects of our linguistic practice which, inter alia, has the advantage that it seems much more 
appropriate as a strategy aimed at teaching a term. 
Namely, if we accept Dummett’s suggestions, it seems that by distinguishing 
descriptive from evaluative aspects of the meaning we would be in a position to make a 
certain distinction between predicates that we would use for this purpose, thus introducing 
systematicity into our method which is necessary in such circumstances. In this regard, of the 
predicates that we could teach our hypothetical perceiver, it seems that the predicate 'Two-
legged creature' would be the one that, due to its phenomenal content, he could adopt most 
easily in the sense that its implementation would not significantly disrupt his own 
interpretative apparatus, or lead to its non-conservative extension.  
In other words, we will assume that descriptive aspects can, at least in principle, be 
explicated in such a way that despite different interpretative frameworks used by us and our 
hypothetical perceiver, it would still be possible to reach a consensus that they are universally 
applicable, so we would start from them and gradually introduce him to the concept 'Man', 
namely, teach him all the predicates we subsume under it. However, the problem here is that 
we have no basis for the assumption necessary to avoid the infinite regress we came across 
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following Peirce’s suggestions, that is, we have no guarantee that what belongs to descriptive 
aspects of the meaning of a term or an assertion cannot be further divided according to 
Dummett’s criterion. 
In fact, if we go back to the example given by Dummett himself, where the descriptive 
condition for introducing the term 'Boche' into a language that did not have it until then 
would be that it is a person of German nationality, and the evaluative one that this person is 
more cruel and cruelty inclined than other Europeans, the question is what would be the 
condition for introducing the term 'German' or 'Member of the German nation'? We are not 
saying that it is impossible to give an acceptable definition in this case, on the contrary, we 
still believe that the way to learn new, unfamiliar terms is covered much better by Dummett’s 
criterion than by Peirce’s one. However, we argue that, just as in Peirce’s case of listing 
predicates, it would be insufficient to get such an idea of the concept in the sense that it 
would be the result of a perceptual judgment. To show this, it will suffice to return to our 
example. 
Namely, although it seems plausible that the descriptive condition for introducing the 
term 'Man' into a dictionary that did not have it until then would be that it is a two-legged, 
and the evaluative one that it is a rational creature, the problem is that the concept of two-
legged creature is in our case still largely coextensive with the concept of humanity, but it 
will not be so in the case of our perceiver. Hence it follows that by adopting the predicate 
'Two-legged creature' he will adopt one of the phenomenal features of humanity that is in this 
case aptly highlighted in the sign itself, but that actually makes us who teach it attribute the 
content to it that we would not otherwise attribute, more precisely, to, misled by the character 
of the sign, substantially narrow its domain. 
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In other words, we believe that 'two-leggedness', understood as one of the phenomenal 
features of humanity would be not only a partial and insufficient determinant of the concept 
'Man', but above all a partial and insufficient determinant of the concept 'Two-legged 
creature'. The primary reason for this is that the definition of an object as a sample of a class 
of two-legged creatures actually hides a series of tacit assumptions that only thanks to the 
iconicicity of the sign have something to do with the fact that it walks on two legs, while in 
reality they primarily concern understanding of its place in the evolutionary chain, implying a 
whole network of views that, in the case of forming the judgment 'This is a two-legged 
creature', would be evaluative in character. 
 
V 
Therefore, just as with introducing the term 'Man' into a language that did not have it 
until then, when introducing the term 'Two-legged creature' we would also come across the 
distinction between descriptive and evaluative aspects of the meaning which in these two 
cases would not nearly be coextensive. It follows that it would be at the very least unclear 
how a learned concept could impose itself as we assume that perceptual judgments impose 
themselves if every new definition introduces a new concept that requires definition and so 
on ad infinitum. 
However, if this is evidence that Dummett’s strategy is useless for the goals we have 
set – because how can we benefit from it if, for the purpose of forming a perceptual 
judgment, we cannot determine which are descriptive and which ones evaluative aspects of 
its meaning, that is, if determining them would always lead us to new distinctions – the 
question is then what is the difference between his and Peirce’s strategy, or why do we give 
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preference to Dummett’s given the fact that in both cases we are faced with virtually infinite 
set of predicates?6 
                                                             
6 It seems that in this case we might be able, with the help of Dummett's strategy, to reach a point where the 
regress of justification ends and it would be the point in which we would replace the term 'two-legged creature' 
with the term 'biped' as something that, using Russell’s terminology but in a different sense, would be 'quite 
simple and could not be further analysed'. However, apart from the fact that bipedalism is not a unique feature 
of human species, we should also not think that by introducing this term we would come to something that is 
independent of any theoretical assumptions, or that this term is simple in the sense that it does not have 
descriptive and evaluative aspects of the meaning. This brings us to a point that, unfortunately, we cannot 
address in more detail but we believe it to be extremely important. Namely, we can say that, according to 
Peirce’s semiotics, the sign ‘Man’ would figure as a symbol of a class, while ‘Rationality’ would be its index. 
The term ‘Two-legged creature’, because of its similarity to the signified would in that case be an icon. 
However, the question is what kind of similarity is it? We see here a potentially fruitful point of merging 
Peirce’s semiotics and structuralist approaches in linguistics and anthropology in which linguistic phenomena 
are observed not only at the level of terms, but also at the level of morphemes and phonemes where there is a 
strong tendency to treat them as phenomena whose architectonics belongs to the realm of the unconscious. Thus, 
the morphology itself of the sign ‘bipedalism’ would represent descriptive aspects of the meaning, that is, it 
would be telling that not any sign could be used for the phenomenal aspect of two-leggedness, but precisely the 
sign that proves the thesis that linguistic sign is not entirely arbitrary, or that it is “arbitrary a priori, but ceases to 
be arbitrary a posteriori” (Levi-Strauss 1963: 91). It follows that the evaluative aspect of the meaning in this 
case would imply separate knowledge of the meaning of terms ‘Bi’ and ‘Pedalism’. However, since the 
arbitrariness of the sign is more pronounced at this level, we would need to know all those associative sequences 
that these terms evoke (which would be nothing but knowledge of an entire language), which, however, we 
could not possibly expect from our hypothetical perceiver. In other words, we want to say something that is too 
often ignored in philosophy, that the phonetic body of which a term is made up is by no means a negligible 
aspect of what it is, that is, in the philosophy of language these terms are generally used interchangeably so it is 
irrelevant if one has the form 'Man' and the other 'Quoche' as long as their content is same. However, just as it is 
not insignificant that we call a certain object 'Man' and not 'Two-legged creature', it is also not insignificant, 
though in a slightly different sense, that someone calls something 'Quoche', that is, even in the symbol itself 
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Although the distinction between descriptive and evaluative aspects of the meaning has 
no reality – which is a truth reflected, inter alia, in the fact that we cannot come across 
something like this, an artificially produced, non-conservative extension of language – 
properly understood, it has a certain value for us as evidenced by examples such as when a 
subject has only a partial understanding of a term, or rather, when he thinks he understands it 
but the fact of the matter is that, due to various sociolects of the language, he does not really 
understand it. Something similar to this would be in the case of the term 'Two-legged 
creature', which we and our hypothetical perceiver would comprehend differently in the sense 
that he would not mean everything that we mean by this term, so we could rightly say that he 
does not understand it. However, one should not think that the reason for this is that he 
understands only some of its aspects, but that he does not understand all those aspects that we 
understand, that is, the aspects that he understands are always and only descriptive aspects. 
On the other hand, what we mean by the term 'Two-legged creature' should in no way be 
understood as a norm that our perceiver, unable to adopt evaluative aspects of the meaning of 
this term too, has failed to achieve. 
In other words, if we assume that the term in question is the result of a perceptual 
judgment, we believe that the whole content covered by it also belongs to descriptive aspects, 
but they do not appear as a condition for its formation – as implied by the view in which it is 
regarded as the result of an abductive argument – but as a consequence of disharmony in 
communication. However, since it is clear that the character of this disharmony will vary 
from context to context, it also means that it cannot be determined a priori, as Dummett and 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
there is a connection with the signified that may not be existential, but at one level of mediation it is certainly 
important for the overall perceptual (interpretative) apparatus of the subject. Since this apparatus implies an 
understanding of an entire language, it seems that the above mediation belongs to the realm of the unconscious – 
just as it is emphasized in certain disciplines – but there is no room here for discussing this issue in more detail. 
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philosophers of ordinary language tried to do which are descriptive aspects of the meaning of 
a term and which ones evaluative, but it will, somewhat generally speaking, depend on the 
context of communication where the only norm would be the efficiency of communication, 
that is, its loss as a sign that they are present. 
Therefore, in order to be as precise as possible, we could say that descriptive aspects of 
the meaning concern the percipuum, while the evaluative ones belong to the percept. 
However, although they are both integral components of the perceptual judgment,7 they still 
do not have reality in themselves, but will be formed only when there is a break in 
communication and when we have no other choice but to evaluate our knowledge. In short, 
percept and percipuum will appear only then, and together with them the difference between 
descriptive and evaluative aspects of the meaning where the former will belong to the 
percipuum, and the latter to the percept.  
This is the reason why Dummett’s strategy is important for us because instead of the 
idea that the content is supposed to be inscribed in objects by the act of perception, it leads us 
to what we understand in contact with some of them, and since everything we understand 
would belong to descriptive aspects, it is also clear which ones would be evaluative aspects. 
In a word, evaluative aspects would be all those that, due to the various content that we 
inscribe in it make the path to efficient use of a term blocked.8 However, it seems that we 
                                                             
7 Although Peirce’s view includes various and sometimes inconsistent interpretations of percept and percipuum, 
when he speaks of percipuum he mostly refers to it as "percept immediately interpreted in the perceptual 
judgment" (CP 7.643). 
8 Therefore, one should not think that evaluative aspects belong to the realm of unconscious, hidden, and 
descriptive ones, on the other hand, to the conscious, transparent, etc., but that the whole perceptual judgment or 
more precisely, the process whereby we form the percipuum belongs to the realm of the unconscious, which will 
become conscious, or be divided into percept and percipuum only if there is a need for it, in other words 
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have not yet completely solved the problem of infinite regress, because it seems that, at least 
within his own interpretative repertoire a subject could always single out those predicates that 
constitute the content of a perceptual judgment; on the other hand, the fact that the conclusion 
reached in this way would be non-conclusive, or that there is a virtually indefinite number of 
predicates that fall under one concept could be compared to the infinite regress we had in 
Dummett’s case. 
In other words, it seems that one can still ask questions such as 'Are there predicates 
that would be necessary to form a perceptual judgment and which ones are they?' and 'Can 
we assume that some concepts can function as percipuums while this does not apply to 
others?', etc. However, we believe that we have shown that to ask such questions would be 
the result of a fundamentally wrong view. 
In fact, their relevance, as well as the relevance of the problem of infinite regress of 
justification can be very easily neutralized and in practice they are neutralized precisely by 
the fact that Peirce pointed out – that a perceptual judgment 'imposes itself on us by a process 
we cannot control' which necessarily disqualifies any listing of predicates such as the one in 
the case of abductive inference as a way of its formation. In a word, it seems that such listing 
would in fact always be just an explication of an interpretative apparatus, or that in cases that 
would require it, it would not be an abduction but, in our opinion, a detection. However, this 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
whenever, to paraphrase Peirce, the road to understanding is blocked, which unblocks the road to inquiry. On 
the other hand, in favour of the affinity between this and Dummett’s general view that does not regard the 
meaning of a sentence in terms of its truth value, but "in terms of the conditions under which it is verified" 
(Misak 1995: 119), since these conditions vary from case to case they could be compared with evaluative 
aspects of the meaning as we interpret them, or both in understanding of an object and a term, "in a capacity to 
recognize whatever is counted as verifying it (but not perceiving it, A/N)" (Dummett 1976: 110-111). 
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does not mean that we reject abduction as a redundant concept, but that we give it a more 
specific definition. 
Namely, when we perceive, we assume that we have such an idea of the object that we 
do not need to think about it as well, otherwise it would be a sign that there is an obstacle in 
understanding (whether of the object or someone’s interpretation of it, because in both cases 
we are faced with something that is unknown to us and we should discover what it is) which 
we cannot overcome in any other way but methodically, that is, with the help of a systematic 
approach that would be reflected in the attribution of predicates or detection as we call it. 
However, although it would have the structure of an abductive argument, it is important to 
note that this method would be closely related to Peirce’s thesis that there is a "creative 
element in perceptual awareness, an interpretive creativity brought by the perceiver" 
(Rosenthal 2004: 193), and that reality "always swims in a continuum of uncertainty and of 
indeterminacy" (CP 1.171) which we eliminate primarily through various interpretative 
frameworks or, as Peirce calls them, 'bodies of settled beliefs' whereby we approach it, etc. 
In other words, unlike abductive inference in the strict sense, which would recognize 
only logical (formal), this method would have to comply with strong epistemic (conceptual) 
constraints imposed by Peirce’s views such as that "what is 'given' at the most fundamental 
level of perceptual awareness is in fact a 'taken' and incorporates both nature of the taking 
and the nature of what is taken" (Rosenthal 2004: 201) or, given its consequences, the most 
far-reaching of them all, that perceptual judgment is "absolutely beyond criticism" (CP 
5.181). However, what is important here is that both would have an inferential structure, that 
is, a structure that Peirce attributed to abduction,9 while this would by no means be the case 
                                                             
9 Therefore, since it would be abductive, this structure would also be non-conclusive. However, what should be 
noted here given the difference that we believe exists between them is that the above non-conclusiveness in 
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when it comes to perception. Namely, it might have some sort of structure, but this structure 
is not such that we could abstract the discrete elements of the process whereby we reach a 
perceptual judgment; in a word, that structure is not inferential. 
 
VI 
Thus, that the result of a perceptual judgment is not the result of inference is evidenced 
by the fact that, if we have no idea what an object is, for us it will be a percept to which we 
will apply the method of detection; otherwise, the judgment about it in the form of percipuum 
would impose itself by a process we could not control, which would make any inference 
redundant. In other words, we hope that we succeeded in creating a fruitful synthesis of the 
two views where Dummett’s method was useful to eliminate from Peirce’s interpretation of 
perception the thesis that we consider superfluous and even inaccurate, which is the thesis 
that perceptual judgment has an inferential structure. On the other hand, the idea which we 
specifically argued for, that it imposes itself on us by a process we cannot control has enabled 
us to, in our opinion, give a more acceptable interpretation than the one offered by Dummett 
of which would be descriptive aspects of our linguistic practice and which ones evaluative, or 
more precisely, of harmony that would have to exist between them. 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
these two cases would be different in character. Namely, while the first would concern the fact that no matter 
how many predicates we attribute to a concept we will not come to a conclusion that is necessarily true, in the 
second it would be a consequence of the fact that the conclusion we reached is not the result of (perceptual) 
judgment that is exempt from any criticism and therefore, conclusive. For more detailed information on the 
special, epistemic character of perceptual judgment see: Sandra Rosenthal, "Peirce's pragmatic account of 
perception: Issues and implications", The Cambridge companion to Peirce (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2004), pp. 193-213. 
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In a word, we hope that we managed to show that to understand perceptual judgment as 
a conclusion of an abductive argument would be an inadequate account of the way we reach 
it, because it would satisfy only evaluative conditions which implies that the act of perception 
did not actually occur. However, Peirce would not have been such a great philosopher had 
this fact remained completely unknown to him. 
Namely, although he may have had second thoughts about the true nature of perceptual 
judgment, as we know and have seen to some extent, Peirce offered such a wealth of insights 
related both to it and abduction in general that our attempt is at best only an interpretation of 
his views. In this regard, this paper would be best understood as a step towards emphasizing 
the thesis that we believe to be extremely important because it paves the way for initiating the 
view that some theorists unjustly attributed to Bergson, which is, in fact, Peirce’s view, that 
"every human mind is a locus of virtual experience" (Levi-Strauss 1991: 103). It is Peirce’s 
thesis that perceptual judgment "has the peculiarity of not being abstractly thought, but 
actually seen", or that it is "virtual" (CP 8.66) which is a step that we could not have made 
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